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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RICHARD WHIPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs .. -
HAROLD FULLER, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
- vs.-
DON C. CHRISTENSEN, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT O~F FACTS 
Case 
No. 8409 
On June 3, 1951, Richard Whipple, respondent and plain-
tiff, entered into a written sub-contract agreement with Don 'C. 
Christensen, respondent and third party defendant, a licensed 
contractor, thereby undertaking to furnish, install, alter, change, 
repair and remove certain plumbing and plumbing fixtures in, 
to, on and about a building owned by Harold Fuller, appellant 
and defendant, in Salt Lake City, Utah, for the agreed contract 
sum of $1,513.00 and that the said plaintiff did so furnish, install, 
alter, change, repair and remove said plumbing and plumbing 
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fixtures. Defendant had thertofore entered into a contract 
with third party defendant and others for the remodeling of 
said building in the sum of $5,770.00 which has been paid to 
the third party defendant. Defendant did not take out a bond 
at the tilne of his contract with the third party defendant. On 
June 3, 1951, plaintiff was a licensed journeyman plumber but 
had not applied for a contractor's license, nor has he since 
been licensed as such. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that 
he was a licensed contractor and sought recovery in the amount 
of $1,646.50 and interest on the contract. Prior to hearing evi-
dence the Trial Court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend 
over the defendant's objection based on surprise and the com-
plaint was amended to include an allegation that the agreed 
contract sum was the fair and reasonable value of the services 
rendered and a prayer for judgment for reasonable value. 
Prior to the trial at the request of counsel for third party de-
fendant an indemnity agreement between defendand and third 
party defendant was admitted in evidence by the stipulation of 
all parties and was used and referred to throughout the trial. The 
contract read, in part, "It is expressly understood that the par-
ties of the first part (third party defendant and wife) will save 
the party of the s·econd part (defendant) harmless from any 
claims of laborers or ·materialmen arising out of the remodel-
ing ... of the building at 105 "B" Street in Salt Lake City, 
Utah." At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendant moved 
for a judgment of non-suit on the grounds that the plaintiff 
had not proved that he was a licensed contractor and moved 
for leave to amend his complaint to plead and seek recovery 
against the third party defendant on the contract admitted 
and used by stipulation. The . Trial Court denied both mo-
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tions. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and against 
the defendant in the amount of $1,350.00 and for the third party 
defendant and against the defendant, no cause of action. From 
these orders and judgments defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF PO·INTS 
I 
PLAINTIFF, AN UNLICENSED SUB-CO·NTRACTO·R, 
COULD NOT MAINTAIN AN ACTI·O·N AGAINST THE DE-
FENDANT AND THE COURT ERRED IN N·OT GRANT-
ING A NON-SUIT AND IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR O;F THE PLAINTIFF. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRA!NTIN·G PLAINTIFF'S 
M·OTIO·N TO AMEND H'IS COMPLAINT AND IN D 1E-
NYIN~G DEFENDANTS MOTION TO AMEND HIS THIRD 
PARTY C01\1PLAINT. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF, AN UNLICENSED SUB-C·O·NTRACT'OR, 
COUL~D NOT MAINTAIN AN ACTIO·N AGAINST THE DE-
DEFENDANT AND THE CO'URT ERRED IN NOT GRAN~T­
IN·G A NON-SUIT AND IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN 
FAVO·R OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
The plaintiff introduced no evidence that he was a li-
censed contractor and the defendant introduced uncontradicted 
evidence that the plaintiff had never been licensed prior to 
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th~ time of trial, nor had the plaintiff ever applied for a con-
tractor's license. 
Section · 58-6-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that 
"It shall be unlawful for any p~rson ... to enage in the busi-
ness or act in the capacity of contractor ... without having a 
license therefor . . . ,, and U. C. A. 1953, 58-6-10, provides 
penalties of fine and imprisonment, or both, for acting in such 
a capacity \\7hile unlicensed. A contractor is defined in 58-6-3 
U. C. A., as follows: 
"A contractor . . . is a person . . . who for a fixed 
sum . . . undertakes with another for the construction, 
alteration, repair, addition to or improvement, of any 
building . . . or other structure . . . or any part thereof; 
provided, that the term contractor ... shall include 
sub-contractor . . . ". 
That the plaintiff was acting as a contractor within the 
meaning of the oode is attested to by the term of his contract, 
the allegations of his complaint and his stipulations on appeal. 
It cannot be argued with any less impunity that a licensed 
plumber is exempt from securing a contractors license while 
acting as such than it can be that a licensed doctor, dentist 
or optometrist would be exempt from securing such a license 
under similar circumstances. That the legislature intended 
such a construction is manifest in the language of U. C. A. 1953, 
58-18-14, (regulating plumbers) enacted in 1937, four years 
after the. act regulating contractors was on the books, which 
reads: 
"The general p1:ovisions of Title 58, . . . including the 
prohibitions and penalties thereof, shall be applicable 
to the administration and enforcement of this act, in so 
far as they are not in conflict herewith." 
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The one act is obviously designed to protect the public from 
bad plumbing and the other to protect it from bad contractors 
and sub-contractors. Inversely, a licensed contractor could 
surely not maintain that he did. not need a license to do actual 
plumbing work. Further, the penalty for acting as a con-
tractor without a license is a $500.00 fine, U. 'C. A., 58-6-10, 
while the penalty for carrying on the trade of plumbing without 
a certificate is a $300.00 fine, U. C. A. 1953, 58-18-14 and 
58-1-39. The two sections are also distinguishable in the causes 
for which licenses issued thereunder may be revoked, U. C. A. 
1953, 58-6-6, and 58-18-8. In the California case Kirman V. 
Borzage, 65CA.2d 156 150 P. 2d 3, the Second District Court 
of Appeals in applying similar licensing_ statutes ruled that 
a licensed plumber could not maintain any action in the 
courts resulting from undertaking to do plumbing work on a 
contract basis without showing that the plumber had a con-
tractor=-s license. To argue that the work done by the plaintiff 
was done under a prime contractor who was licensed and that 
the plaintiff is thus exempt from the provisions of the act re-
quiring contractors to obtain licenses as such is to reduce 
the language of the legislature whereby "subcontractors" are 
specifically included within the scope of the act to complete 
absurdity and meaninglessness since there can never be a sub-
contractor without a prime contractor and hence all subcon-
tractors could escape the clear intent of the statute by the 
means of this guise. 
The Supreme Court of this state has twice ruled that the 
contracts of persons who fall within the prohibition of the 
act regulating contractors and who fail to comply \Vith its pro-
visions are void and has wisely based such decisions on the 
strong public policy of not allowing a violator of a statute 
prohibiting 3pecific acts to recover anything from the public, 
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whose protection the statute contemplates, for the commission 
of the specific acts prohibited by the statute. Olsen v. Reese, 
114 U. 411, 200 P. 2d 733, and Eklund v. Elw·ell, 116 U. 521, 
211 P. 2d 849. The general rule in such cases is clearly set 
forth in 30 /\ .. L. R. 843, and in 42 A. L. R. at page 1227: 
"It is well settled that, where the statute is enacted 
for the protection of the public, and expressly pro-
hibits under penalty, and there is nothing in the lan-
guage which indicates an intent ·to limit its scope to. 
the exaction of a penalty . . . and there is nothing in 
the subject matter to justify a presumed intent on the 
part of the law makers to relieve the wrongdoer from 
the ordinary consequences of a forbidden act, a con-
tract made without having procured the required li-
cense creates no right of action which a court of justice 
will enforce.'' (Itallics supplied by appellant); 
and in 53 ·CORPUS JURIS SECUN·DUM 714: 
"Where a contract is unenforceable by one of the parties 
thereto by reason of his noncompliance with a license ... 
law, such party may not recover for services which he 
has performed under such contract." (Itallics supplied 
by the appellant.) 
The rule rests squarely and soundly on the compelling public 
policy of denying relief indirectly as against one of a group pro-
tected by the licensing act on behalf of the unlicensed plain-
tiff through the guise of the implied promise of the quantum 
counts or unjust enrichment that which such plaintfif cannot 
recover directly on his contract. In other words where the 
legislature has passed a constitutional act for the protection 
of the public making unlawful and penalizing certain acts of 
business and professional people and such people can protect 
themselves against the criminal and civil ·consequences thereof 
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by the simple expedient of complying with the act, the _S..Ourts 
will not dignify the prohibited actions by intervening on the 
criminal's behalf and permit him to recover on his contract 
or upon any other grounds at the expense of one whom the 
statute is clearly designed to protect. It would make little 
sense indeed to declare the contracts of unlicensed persons 
void and unforceable on the grounds that the courts will not 
dignify an illegal act by enforcing the criminal's contract rights 
and then erect an enforceable implied contract or promise to 
pay for the benefits derived by the defendant from the plain-
tiffs criminal acts. 
Thus in Sherwood v. Wise, 132 W. 295 232 P 309, decided 
in 1925, an unlicensed architect was percluded from recovering 
either his contract price or the reasonable value of his services 
performed thereunder. In Alvardo v. Daoo, 115 C. A. 782, 
6P. 2d 121, it was held that a statute similar to the Utah Statute 
was for the protection of the public and the Court said: 
"We need not decide whether the lien was timely, be-
cause the failure to comply with the act relating to the 
registration and licensing of contractors bars recovery.', 
l(Itallics supplied by appellant) 
In Cash v. Blackett, 81 C. A. 2d. 233, 196 P. 2d 585, an un-
licensed California contractor was precluded from foreclosing 
a mechanic's lien since the work done grew out of an unen-
forceable contract. An unlicensed architect has no right of 
action to recover for his services. Gionti v. Crown Motor Co., 
New Jersey 1942, 26 A. 2d 282. The following language was 
used in Board of Education v .Elliot a Kentucky case decided 
in 193.9, 276 Ky. 790, 125 S. W. 2d 733: 
"The purpose of the act requiring architects to be li-
censed is to safeguard life, health and property, and one 
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assuming to act as an architect, who has not procured 
a license, ·cannot maintain an action for services." 
In Harris v. Clark, 81 Ind. A. 494, 142 N. E. 881, decided in 
1924, it was held that an unlicensed attorney could ont recover 
either upon his contract or upon an implied promise to pay 
for the reasonable value of legal services performed. Baer v. 
Tippett, 34 C. A. 2d 33, 92 P. 2d 1028, decided in 1939 not 
only held that an unlicensed architect has no right of re-
covery for his services but refused to allow the reasonable 
value of his services as a contractor since the contract in ques-
tion called for the performance of both types of services even 
though the plaintiff was licensed as a contractor at the time. 
The Pennsylvania Court was faced with the consrruction of 
statutes similar to the ones in question wherein penalties of 
jail and fines were imposed on the practice of engineering and 
architecture ~thout a license and the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion in assumpsit (quantum counts) in a case decided in 1940, 
and the Court held: 
"It is well settled that the courts will not lend their 
aid to the enforcement of unlawful contracts which are 
founded upon transactions in violation of a public policy 
declared by the legislature . . . .:.:The clear purpose 
and intent of the act ... is that the transaction of busi-
ness contrary to law should not receive the aid of courts, 
by permitting recovery of commissions ... '' (quoting 
Golder v. RabinotVitz, 190 A. 407:) There is no force 
to plaintiffs contention that the penalties imposed by 
these statutes are intended to be the sole punishment 
for infractions thereof. If the courts were to enforce 
such unlawful conrracts the relatively small fine to which 
violators of the law are made subject would he insuf-
ficient to discourage repeated violations ... it would 
be a hardship if defendant were permitted to evade 
a just obligation . . . But it is a hardship created by 
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plaintiffs own conduct and not by the harshness of the 
rule of law." F. F. Bollinger Co. v. Widman Corp., 
14 A. 2d 81. 
Hickey v. Sutton, 210 N. W. 704, decided in Wisconsin in 1926, 
cites Sherwood v. vVise, supra, with approval and goes on to say: 
"There is no conflict in the authorities upon the rule 
that the failure to procure a license bars recovery where 
the license is exacted as a police measure for the pro-
tection of the public . . . The rule applies with equal 
force whether the requirement is sought upon contract 
or upon quantum meruit. If the necessity of procur-
ing a license could be avoided by neglecting to make 
the contract and then recovering upon quantum meruit, 
an easy way would be found to nullify the statute.'' 
It was held that an Idaho collection agency who had not pro-
cured the proper license under an act making such failure a 
misdemeanor could not sue in any court. Goranson v. Brady-
McGowan Co., 48 I. 261, 281 P. 370, wherein the Court said: 
"Compliance with and enforcement of the statute is 
as effectively accomplished by not allowing an un-
authorized party to carry on the collection business 
or sue in connection therewith as to not allow such 
person to collect compensation therefor after the serv-
ices have been rendered." 
The general rule laid down in the case of contracts and 
rights of unlicensed persons is simply an application of the 
broader general rule which is expressed in 12 AMERICAN 
JURISPR·UDEN·CE 713, Section 209: 
The maxims c' ex turpi causa non oritur actio" and ccex 
dolo malo non oritur actio," founded as they are on 
sound morals, have for a long time been applied hy 
courts in the practical administration of justice. Under 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
the doctrine expressed in these maxims, it has been 
said that no court will allow itself to be made the in-
strument of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out 
of an agreement or transaction which is illegal. In other 
words, no action can be based on an illegal agreement. 
The rule rests upon the broad ground that no court 
will allow itself to be used when its judgment will con-
summate an act forbidden :by law. It has its founda-
tion in the policy of discouraging illegal and corrupt 
agreements by refusing all judicial aid to the parties 
to them. This rule applies to any agreement which 
is illegal, immoral, or against public policy or pro-
hibited by public law, and to any agreem·ent which has 
for its purpose the commission of a crime or is for-
bidden 'by statute. Such agreements cannot be en-
forced by one party against the other, either directly 
by asking the court to carry them into effect or in-
directly by claiming damages or compensation for 
breach of them. An agreem·ent contrary to public pol-
icy will not be enforced, though in the particular in-
stance no actual injury may have resulted to the public 
and the parties were not conscious that they were doing 
a thing which the law did not approve ... The illegal-
ity of an agreement may be insisted upon by persons. 
not parties thereto, where claim founded on the agree-
ment is asserted against them." 
Thus is it manifest that the general rule of law, based 
as it is on ancient and sound principals; public policy; and 
the rules announced in the cases cited deny the plaintiff any 
standing in a court of jus~ce whether his cause sound in con-
tract, quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. VVhat then is 
his standing in the instant cause based as it is on the defendant's 
failure to post the bond required by U. C. A. 14-2-1 and 2? 
Does the court have any greater compulsion to grant relief, 
thus circumventing the criminal and civil sanctions of the 
act regulating contractors? Logical extension of the general 
rule and in fact the terms and reasoning of the general rule 
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itself would dictate not. Would the Court lessen the effective-
ness of the prohibitions imposed for the protection of the pub-
lic by the statute regulating contractors by zealously enforcing 
the letter of a statute obviously designed to protect a special 
class - materialmen and mechanics? The act requiring an 
owner to post a bond can only become effective in protecting 
materialmen and mechanics in the event that a contractor 
runs true to the apparent natural propensities of the class 
and does the very things that U. C. A. 58-6-6 seeks to regulate, 
i.e., 1) abandons the contract, or 2) diverts the funds from 
a specific contract. The one act thus regulates and prohibits 
certain acts by contractors and protects the general public 
therefrom by making the violation of the act a misdemeanor 
and impliedly denies violators civil redress in the courts of 
this state and the other protects materialmen and mechanics 
from the selfsame acts by contractors by requiring a bond to 
be posted in their behalf and granting them a special right of 
action against the owner if such bond is not posted. Surely a 
contractor violating the provisions of the first cannot seek the 
benefits of the latter. The act requiring the bond cannot under 
any possible interpretation be deemed per se to protect the 
general public from these propensities of contra~tors. , It 
merely dictates that the public shall protect mechanics and 
materialmen and indirectly itself by demanding a bond from 
the contractor at its own cost whether it pay for the same di-
rectly or indirectly as an additional cost of the building proj-
ect contemplated. The "any person" of U. C. A. 14-2-1 and 2, 
must surely be held to be limited to those acting in good faith 
and complying with the licensing and other regulations of the 
sovereign who grants this special right of action to such special 
group, the right of action being unknown to the common law. 
This statute should not weaken appellant's position nor confer 
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upon respondent some new standing before the courts since 
the act does not create a new statutory cause of action in 
favor of materialmen and mechanics, it merely gives an exist-
ing right of action (quantum meruit for reasonable value) to 
materialmen and mechanics against one not theretofor liable. 
"Where the parties are in pari delicto the law will leave 
them where it finds them.· "12 AMERICAN JURISP'RUDEN·CE 
721. "The view that no relief should be given in such a case 
seems to have been applied ever since the celebrated case in 
which a highwayman sought to compel his associates to ac-
count for the proceeds of their enterprise." 12 A·MERICAN 
JURISPRUD·ENCE 729. Surely there was never a more sound 
application of this principal than in the instant case ~here 
the plaintiff consumated a prohibited act in an unlawful man-
ner and the defendant failed to post a bond as required by 
law. The only departure from this rule is to be observed where 
one party is held to be less guilty than the other, hence not in 
pari delicto. Surely, if a departure from the rule is to be made 
in the instant case one who violates a provision of a statute 
requiring a bond for which violation no criminal consequences 
are imposed is much less in guilt than one who violates an 
act passed for the protection of the public the acts in violation 
thereof being prohibited, declared to be unlawful and consti-
tuting a misdemeanor. 
II 
THE C·OURT ERRED IN GRANTIN'G PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION T·O AMEN·D HIS COMPLAINT AN·D IN DE:NY-
ING D,EFENDANT':S MOTION TO AMEND HIS THIRD 
PARTY CO·MPLAINT. 
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'·A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course ... Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the. adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires ... " UTA'H 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 15 (a). Rule 15 (b) 
provides: 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evi-
dence and to raise these issues may be made upon mo-
tion of any party at any time ,even after judgment; but 
failure to so amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues." 
The contract which the defendant and third party plaintiff 
sought to plead and recover under by amendment was intro-
duced in evidence at the trial pursuant to a stipulation of all 
the parties solicited by the third party defendant immediately 
prior to the trial itself. The document was provided by the 
third party defendant and was used and referred to throughout 
the course of the trial. At the close of the plaintiff's case third 
party plaintiff sought the amendment before it put on any evi-
dence of its own and the motion was denied. In the light of 
the express provisions of the rules above defendant and third 
party plaintiff was prejudiced thereby, particularly in the 
light of the rfrial Court's decision to allow an amendment in 
the plaintiffs behalf alleging a new cause of action against the 
defendant prior to the introduction of any evidence. 
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The Trial Court committed reversible error in failing to 
grant defendant's motion for a non-suit and in failing to allow 
the defendant and third party plaintiff to amend his complaint 
to conform to the evidence introduced by the third party 
defendant upon the stipulation of all parties to the action. The 
judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed, and the cause 
should be remanded. Defendant-appellant should be awarded 
the costs of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FORREST W. FULLER 
Attorney for Appellant 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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